



EXCISE

FILE 145-0058

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
 REVIEWED BY: *Clarified* DATE: *2/4/81*
 TO ATTENTION: *Moguel* REASON(S): *UADR*
 ENDORSE EXISTING EARNINGS ☐ *COA*
 L/C (SUSPENDED) RELEASEABLE *2/13/81*
 RELEASE DENIED *in part*
 PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS *B1 1.3a 3/*

ROUTINE

ALDAC-

CFR REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE FOR POLADS ONLY

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/30/2000 (TARNOFF, PETER)

TAGS: XX, US

SUBJECT: (U) CURRENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, ISSUE NO. 5,
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6. {U} INR - INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS: THE DIFFICULTY OF IMPROVEMENT {GDS 1/30/86}

--PAKISTAN AND INDIA--IN THE WAKE OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS, THE INDIAN ELECTIONS--FEEL PRESSURE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. BUT THEIR INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO THE AFGHAN SITUATION LIKELY WILL ALSO LEAD TO FURTHER DIFFERENCES THAT WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

{C} THE PAKISTANIS DO NOT WANT AN ANTAGONISTIC INDIA TO THE SOUTH WHILE THEY FACE A CHALLENGE ON THEIR NORTHERN BORDER. PRESIDENT ZIA UNDERScoreD THIS CONCERN WHEN HE SENT MRS. GANDHI A WARM CONGRATULATORY LETTER, EXPRESSING HOPE THAT BILATERAL PROBLEMS COULD BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF THE 1972 SIMLA ACCORDS. {THOSE ACCORDS PLEDGED EACH SIDE TO RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE OTHER AND TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING ISSUES THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.}

{C} THE INDIANS FOR THEIR PART WANT TO INSULATE SOUTH ASIA FROM THE TURMOIL IN AFGHANISTAN. A STABLE AND FRIENDLY PAKISTAN, IN NEW DELHI'S VIEW, FURTHERS THAT OBJECTIVE. THE INDIANS ARE APPREHENSIVE, HOWEVER, THAT PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE TO THE AFGHAN SITUATION COULD UNDERMINE BILATERAL TIES. NEW DELHI IS CONCERNED THAT:

--PAKISTANI ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN DISSIDENTS WILL TRIGGER A SOVIET RESPONSE. {IN HER JANUARY 36 RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT ZIA, GANDHI CAUTIONED ZIA AGAINST SUCH ASSISTANCE.}

--THE FURNISHING OF US AND CHINESE ARMS TO PAKISTAN MAY LAY THE BASIS FOR A PAKISTAN/US/PRC AXIS THAT WOULD FUEL SUPER-POWER RIVALRY IN SOUTH ASIA.

--A MILITARILY STRENGTHENED PAKISTAN WILL MAKE ZIA LESS WILLING TO RESOLVE BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH INDIA, AS WELL AS GIVE HIM A FALSE SENSE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL SECURITY. {THE INDIANS STRONGLY MAINTAIN THAT A STABLE PAKISTAN REQUIRES A BROADENING OF THE REGIME'S POWER BASE.}

{C} INDIA HAS ALREADY BEGUN CONFERRING WITH ITS SOUTH ASIAN NEIGHBORS ON A REGIONAL RESPONSE TO THE AFGHAN CRISIS. INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY SATHE WILL VISIT ISLAMABAD ON FEBRUARY 4, BUT WE ARE UNAWARE OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THAT SATHE WILL PRESENT. INDEED, IT IS LIKELY THAT INDIRA GANDHI'S GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET COME UP WITH A SET OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES.